The paper proposes an intertemporal equilibrium model of vintage capital and monopolistic competition. Reflecting a tradeoff between the number and capacity of new machines, investment may be extensive or intensive. External gains from specialization and rationalization result in distorted investment decisions. The paper compares the effectiveness of a general investment tax credit with a start-up subsidy that shifts the direction of investment towards a more extensive form. An optimal policy of investment promotion is derived.
INTRODUCTION
Historically, the richest countries were the first in adopting capital-intensive production techniques and investing on a large scale to exploit the economies of mass production. High rates of equipment investment, however, also reflect the strategies of firms to introduce new innovative products and specialized services. Investment thereby contributes to aggregate productivity by enhancing the degree of specialization and division of labor in industry. Investment thus involves an important tradeoff regarding the direction of productivity growth which may reflect either gains from rationalization or gains from specialization. Intensive investment adds only a few machines with huge capacities to exploit the cost advantages of mass production. Extensive investment, in contrast, involves a large number of smaller production units and, thus, contributes to productivity gains from increasing specialization. This paper studies the optimal structure of investment.
De Long and Summers (1991) found a strong and robust statistical relationship between national rates of machinery and equipment investment and productivity growth. They claim that the social returns to equipment investment by far exceed private returns. Some form of investment promotion would help and, indeed, has always been high on the priority list of policymakers. But what is the appropriate structure of investment? In view of the productive spillovers of new firms to the rest of the business community, it is frequently argued that investment should be of a more extensive and, thus, more innovative form. To keep up in high-tech fields, governments often aim to accelerate business formation to establish new firms and production lines at a faster rate. In this paper, we study the appropriate use of two alternative forms of investment subsidies, a start-up subsidy and a general investment tax credit (ITC), that have rather different implications for the direction of investment. The ITC is an ad valorem subsidy proportional to the total value of a project. By way of contrast, a start-up subsidy is a specific subsidy that provides a fixed amount of cash per project unrelated to its size. In order to capture the subsidy more often, investors tend to establish a larger number of smaller production units. In addition to promoting the level of aggregate investment, it also shifts investment towards a more extensive form. Is it then preferable over a proportional ITC?
To shed light on these issues, we propose a unified framework that combines monopolistic competition among diversified producers with vintage capital and start-up investment in equipment and machinery. On each machine, a single, differentiated commodity in the sense of Spence (1976) , Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier (1982) is assembled. Machines may be installed with variable capacity. They are finitely lived and eventually must be replaced with new equipment which is the next possible date to revise the capacity decision. Correspondingly, the pre-existing capital stock is composed of different vintages with possibly different capacities. Taking a cross-section of firms, high-and low-cost producers are seen to coexist but heterogeneity in the business sector eventually disappears as old vintages are replaced by new ones and capacity remains constant in the steady state. 1 The novel feature of this model is that the capacity decision involves an endogenously determined tradeoff between a more innovative form of investment in the extensive direction that addresses specific market niches as opposed to large-scale investment in capital-intensive production techniques.
In shaping the nature of productivity growth, socially efficient investment must weigh the gains from rationalization against those from specialization. Increasing specialization reflects a larger range of tailor-made inputs which raises the productivity of final goods production. Rationalization cuts unit costs and prices of new input goods and similarly saves resource costs of final output. 2 In both cases, however, a large part of the productivity gains are external to the individual investor since production is specialized relative to demand. Start-up investment of a new workshop adds only a single 1. Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) provide evidence that a large part of macroeconomic fluctuations is associated with business failures and start-ups. Chaterjee and Cooper (1993) report a contemporaneous correlation of 0.54 between detrended real GNP and net business formation. According to Jovanovic (1993) , product diversification moves procyclically and increases along with capital accumulation. 2. Hall's (1988) study and related literature finds large markups and strong firm-specific increasing returns to scale. Cabellero and Lyons (1992) find that returns to scale rise at higher levels of aggregation and interpret this as strong productive spilovers across industries. According to Basu (1995) and Basu and Fernald (1997) , however, markups and firm-specific scale economies are only moderately large.
intermediate input but requires the entire range of components embodied in the final output good. If an investor starts up a business and provides a specialized component previously not available, or a given input at lower cost, then this undertaking yields productive spillovers to the rest of the investor community. Private agents fail to include these external benefits in their individual calculus. The social return to investment thus exceeds the private one which creates an obvious reason for investment promotion. However, apart from stimulating the overall level of investment, investment subsidies must additionally reflect the relative importance of gains from rationalization versus specialization, and promote investment in the right direction. The paper builds on Romer's (1987) model of increasing returns owing to specialization. In this context, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Judd (1995) study subsidies to the purchase of capital goods and capital income taxation, respectively. Our notion of start-up investment is formally similar to the free entry condition in the R&D-based endogenous growth literature with horizontal product innovation (see Grossman and Helpman, 1991) . The dynamic models of monopolistic competition and capital accumulation by Kiyotaki (1988) , Hornstein (1993) and Judd (1995) keep the number of firms fixed and, therefore, cannot shed any light on the rate of business formation. Finally, Heijdra (1998) and Broer and Heijdra (1996) study a model of capital accumulation with perfect capital mobility across firms and free entry such that monopoly profits are zero. None of these papers take account of an endogenous capacity decision and the associated tradeoff between extensive and intensive investment.
The paper proceeds in Section 2 to present a tractable vintage capital model emphasizing an endogenous capacity choice as part of the start-up investment decision. An explicit aggregation procedure is proposed and macroeconomic equilibrium is defined. Section 3 provides an analysis of transitional and longrun equilibria and contrasts the dynamic effects of the start-up subsidy with those from a more conventional ITC. It is explained how an optimal policy of investment promotion internalizes the external effects of private investment. Section 4 summarizes the essential results of the paper.
THE MODEL
This section presents a unified framework combining a model of vintage capital with product differentiation in production. Consumption and investment require a final output good that is assembled from specialized component goods supplied under conditions of monopolistic competition. Since the focus is on investment, we choose a simple household sector setup of infinitely-lived representative agents.
Consumption
Households derive utility from current and future consumption. Time preference is reflected in a subjective discount rate &. The final good is consumed at an optimal rate in order to maximize lifetime utility:
The final goods price index is P t and the real interest rate equals r t where a subindex denotes time. The government collects a lump-sum tax T t . Being endowed with one unit of labor, households earn disposable real wage income equal to w L t À T t aP t . Starting with an initial stock of assets V 0 , equal to the value of capital or machines that they own, agents save to achieve a desired rate of consumption growth:
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is given by
The transversality condition lim T3I u H C T V T e À&T 0 rules out degenerate solutions for savings and restricts consumption to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint.
Final goods
Consumption and investment make use of a final good that is produced under conditions of perfect competition from a range of N t differentiated inputs x j t . Following Spence (1976) , Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier (1982) , the technology is specialized to
t is the price of brand j in period t. For a given number of inputs, the technology in (3) is linearly homogeneous. Unit expenditure is thus given by an exact price index P t which is equal to the competitive price of the final good:
Overall expenditure on intermediates is, thus, E t P t D t . Setting a price p j t for a specialized variety results in demand x j t P t ap j t ' D t . Note in particular that the perceived own-price elasticity of demand is constant, ' Àp 
Intermediate goods
In contrast to the strong symmetry assumption in standard monopolistic competition models, we allow for heterogeneity in the business sector that will be reflected in different prices, unit costs and production scale. Each variety is monopolistically supplied by a specialized producer who operates a single machine. To start up a workshop, a quantity j s of the final good must be acquired to install a machine. The size of the machine j s will be explained endogenously as part of the start-up investment decision. Once installed, it yields a fixed amount of capital services, or capacity, over its entire lifetime. Henceforth, h j t h j s indicates the capacity at date t of a machine j installed at date s t. Capacity, or the amount of capital services, is assumed to increase less than proportionately with machine size, h H b 0 and h HH `0. A convenient normalization is h1 1 and h H 1 1. Concavity of the capacity function implies that starting up a workshop requires a fixed installation cost 0` 0`1 such that h 0 0; see Figure 1 below. To capture potential savings from mass production, we additionally assume that total factor productivity A j s of the assembly line is increasing and concave in size: A H b 0 and A HH `0. Thus, we have economies of scale at the plant level which tend to be exhausted with increasing plant size. The subsequent analysis is greatly simplified by parameterizing internal scale economies in a particular way: 5
During the production phase, plant productivity A j t and capacity h j t remain fixed since they are historically set at the date of installation. Since we restricted to values less than two, A remains concave. Our normalization of h implies A1 1 and A H 1 À 1. Later on we will emphasize the competitive 5.
This assumption yields a convenient closed-form solution for real income and the price index in terms of the aggregate capital stock which eliminates the number of goods as an independent state variable. Transitional analysis, which is notoriously difficult in vintage capital models, becomes quite tractable.
ß Verein fu È r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001 case of ' I and 1 where all varieties are perfect substitutes and market power is absent. In that case (5) implies that scale economies within the plant are absent as well. Given plant productivity and capacity, a producer hires labor l j t and assembles a specialized good according to the technology
The function F is quasi-concave and linearly homogeneous in capital and labor services h j t and l j t . The overall technology therefore satisfies the replication principle. Doubling factor inputs by adding a second plant of the same size doubles output. Replication leaves total factor productivity unchanged. However, expanding capacity of the same plant by installing a larger machine and raising labor input in proportion to capital services boosts total factor productivity and, therefore, raises output more than proportionally. This captures the gains from rationalization and mass production. Put differently, rationalization reduces the value-added requirement per unit of output, y j t x j t aA j t . Each producer specializes in a unique brand and is a monopolist in her own market niche. She faces a downward-sloping demand curve with price elasticity '; see Section 2.2. Given the technology (6) and a pre-installed capacity, she maximizes current profits by hiring labor in a competitive labor market at a wage rate w L t :
In exploiting market power, the producer finds it optimal to hire labor until the marginal value product of an additional worker equals the wage rate grossed up by a markup factor:
Facing a common wage rate, all producers are seen to choose an identical capital±labor ratio k t h j t al j t . With the marginal product of labor being equalized, p j t A j t is uniform across workshops. Consequently, the imputed rental rate of capital,
is uniform as well. Production is symmetric except for scale. Since FÁ is linearly homogeneous, it is fully described by unit isoquants. We define unit factor demands and unit value-added costs by
Scaling unit inputsh t ,l t by the amount of value-added production gives total factor demands consistent with full utilization of capacity:
Multiply the two factor pricing relationships with input quantities. Adding up and applying Euler's theorem on F, we have
It will prove most convenient to choose value-added as the numeraire and normalize prices such that 6 w K th t w L tl t 1. Thus, the production decision results in a constant markup of price over unit cost 1aA j t , where unit cost is fixed at the date of installation as in (5):
Reflecting a constant and uniform demand elasticity, the markup factor is constant and identical for all producers as well. With p j t A j t , factor prices are
individual agent expects future cash flow from operating a workshop to increase linearly with installed capacity according to (10). Capacity remains fixed as long as the machine is used. In real terms, a machine of vintage t with capacity h j t thus yields income h j t % s w K s aP s at some future date s ! t, including imputed rental income plus monopoly profits. Equipment deteriorates with age, however, and becomes more accident prone. Once it breaks down, the plant is closed, production of the product line is discontinued and the cash flow terminates. Machine failure is assumed to occur stochastically with an instantaneous probability equal to that is independent across workshops. The expected lifetime of a machine is 1a. It is further assumed that investors hold a sufficiently large collection of machines allowing for full diversification of risk. They are thus concerned only with expected values. The value v t per unit of capital services reflects the expected present value of marginal cash flow:
When establishing a new assembly line at date t, the investor decides about how much capacity h j t to install and accordingly invests an amount j t b 0 of the final good. The government may choose to reduce the private cost of start-up investment by offering an investment tax credit z (ITC). The ITC subsidizes proportionally the total amount of investment. Alternatively, the government may pay a fixed amount ( irrespective of total investment cost, or it may tax start-up investment if ( is chosen negative. This subsidy, or tax, is in specific rather than ad valorem form. The investor collects it or pays the tax whenever she establishes a workshop irrespective of the amount of capital invested. We call it a start-up or entry subsidy. Given tax credits, the investor effectively spends 1 À z j t À ( to start up a new workshop. The investment decision must satisfy
The investor's capacity choice in (a) compares the marginal increase in future returns with the marginal cost of expanding the size of the assembly line. Condition (b) implies that investors are willing to establish new workshops as long as the expected present value of cash flow does not fall short of subsidized start-up costs. In equilibrium, the gross rate of business formation I t must be positive and the free entry condition must hold with equality if there is some aggregate investment at all. Even if net investment is zero, old equipment must be replaced to prevent an erosion of the economy-wide capital stock. Combining (12a,b) determines capacity of a newly established workshop:
Since the subsidy rate does not discriminate, machine size is identical in all new workshops. It also remains time invariant as long as the subsidy rate is not changed. Since h is concave, the start-up subsidy ( leads investors to choose a smaller capacity, H (`0. Figure 1 illustrates. Our normalization implies h1 1 h H 1 at point A. The optimal solution in the absence of any subsidies is in A where the tangent h H 1av according to condition (12a) is equal to the line through the origin with slope h a 1av reflecting the free entry/zero profit condition (12b). Upon inverting it, we have that the present value of marginal cash flow v must not fall short of average cost per unit of capacity, ah v if investment is to break even. With a start-up subsidy ( in place, the tangent at A is less steeply sloped than the line starting at ( and running through A, h H 1av`h a À (. This inequality reflects profits from further start-up investment since the average cost per unit of capacity is lower than its value, v b À (ah . With ever more workshops created, the equilibrium value of a machine must fall until profit opportunities vanish at point B where the two lines coincide again.
Aggregation
Heterogeneity in the business sector complicates aggregation. Since each level of capacity is associated with a particular scale of production, unit costs and prices differ across producers. However, aggregation is simplified by the fact that all producers face the same factor prices whence they state identical unit factor demands. The capital stock is the sum of individual capacities that have been installed in different workshops. Aggregating (8) yields economy-wide resource constraints. The labor force is normalized to unity:
Factor prices are equal to their marginal value-added product, w L t F L h j t Y l j t . By linear homogeneity, marginal products remain unchanged when inputs are scaled by a common factor Y t ay j t . Using (8) and (14), we have
Multiplying (14) with factor prices and using the price normalization w L tl t w K th t 1, one obtains aggregate income at factor cost, w L t w K t K t Y t . Invoking Euler's theorem, we may now reconcile the monopolistic production model with the usual notation in neoclassical growth models:
where f K t is the production function in intensive form. In face of a unitary labor endowment, K t coincides with the capital±labor ratio. Having determined factor income, we integrate (10) and use (14) and (15) to compute aggregate profits and the income expenditure identity:
Note that all workshops operate with an identical capital±labor ratio h j t al j t h t al t K t . Thus, the profit rate % t per unit of capital is uniform in the business sector while total profits of a workshop increase linearly with installed capacity.
Next, we investigate the price index to determine real income. In relating plant productivity to capacity as in (5), one obtains a simple closed-form solution for the price index. Substitute (9) into (4), use (5) and note (14) Now the benefit of writing the rationalization effect as in (5) is evident. Without this assumption, the price index would depend on the product range N t which would enter as an additional state variable. With (5), K t measures the degree of diversification in addition to aggregate capital services. thereby contributes to the specialization and division of labor in industrial production. Reflecting gains from diversification, the price index falls when the aggregate capital stock expands. If instead old vintages are replaced by new ones with larger capacity, component prices decline owing to rationalization. Intensive investment similarly squeezes the price index. Investment may target rationalization or increasing specialization of production. The exponent of the capital stock captures the strength of both types of productivity gains. The value of final output is E t P t D t . Use the income expenditure identity in (16) and divide aggregate spending by the price index given in (17) to obtain real income or the quantity of the final composite good:
The demand function x j t P t ap j t ' D t is the product of real income and compensated unit demand. Substituting (5), (9) and (17), unit demand is P t ap j t ' h j t aK t . It shows how relative prices determine demand structure. A workshop operating with a small scale features high unit costs and prices and, thus, captures only a small share of the market. Consumers tend to substitute away to cheaper mass-produced goods. New suppliers may cut their unit costs by installing larger capacities to rationalize production. With aggregate demand for the composite good given in (18), sales of an individual workshop depend on installed capacity according to
t is defined per unit of capital and was claimed to be the same for each workshop. To check, substitute sales and use (5) and (9) to obtain (16).
Start-up investment in new businesses expands the aggregate capital stock. On the other hand, as equipment deteriorates with age, machines become more accident prone. Machine failure is assumed to occur stochastically with an instantaneous probability equal to that is independent across workshops. Assume that at date s`t, I s assembly lines have been set up to produce I s varieties. Owing to the law of large numbers, a fraction of all machines in place at any date actually breaks down. Thus, of all the machines installed at date s, only a number I sYt I s e ÀtÀs are still working at date t. Goods may similarly be rearranged in order of their date of introduction. Consequently, the interval 0Y N t is completely divided into sub-intervals I sYt with N t t ÀI I sYt ds. The number of goods evolves in line with the net rate of business formation N t I t À N t which is the excess of start-ups over plant closures. While I t new varieties are introduced at date t, the production of a fraction of old goods is discontinued because of machine breakdown. Complete symmetry holds within each sub-interval, i.e. machines and products of the same age are identical. Identifying capital goods by their vintages and adding up capacities as in (14) gives an alternative expression for the aggregate capital stock:
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In dynamic equilibrium, assets must equal the aggregate value of capital, V t v t K t . Differentiating (11) with respect to time yields
Using this together with (19) and (12b),
where the square bracket is dividends, i.e. cash flow less investment outlays. Substituting into (1) consolidates the household and investment sectors. With the government budget constraint T t aP t z t À ( (I t and the definition of factor income in (15), the aggregate income expenditure identity is (18). In equilibrium, aggregate monopoly profits, factor income and the price index all depend on the capital stock. Using the income identity to replace the gross rate of business formation I t in (19), one obtains the resource constraint. Together with (2), the equilibrium system is
Per unit of postponed consumption a number of 1a t workshops is started and, thereby, a productive capacity of h t a t is added to the capital stock. To complete the description of equilibrium, the real interest rate in (b) yet remains to be determined. Interest is given by the rate of return on equipment. When government keeps the subsidy rates constant, the value of machines must remain constant as well for investment to be optimal according to (12) and (13). Consequently, the no-arbitrage condition deriving from (11), r v t % t w K t aP t v t , implies together with (12b) an interest rate of
According to (13), the scale of investment is exclusively determined by the start-up subsidy. The system in (20) together with (21) thus describes dynamic equilibrium. Note in particular that D H m. Provided that real income is increasing and concave, and that real interest is diminishing in capital, one may draw the same type of phase diagram as in the Ramsey model with perfect competition in order to qualitatively describe the dynamics of equilibrium. The condition for concavity is given in the next section. Besides incorporating a tradeoff between intensive and extensive investment, this unifying framework nests several important models as special cases.
With perfect competition, varieties are perfect substitutes in demand (' 3 I, 3 1) which eliminates markups and profits. Setting to unity in (5) fixes plant productivity to unity as well and thus excludes gains from rationalization. Perfect competition cannot be reconciled with scale economies within an individual plant. Perfect substitutability of inputs similarly prevents productivity gains from specialization. The price index thus reduces to unity. By (18) and (21), real income is D t f K t while the gross return is m t f H K t . Capacity choice maximizes the amount of capital services h t a t À ( that may be added to the capital stock per unit of postponed consumption. It is determined by concavity of the installation function h t . With D t and m t determined this way, (21) and (20) reproduce the Ramsey model with perfect competition. The terms relating to capacity can be interpreted as adjustment costs to investment within the firm.
When producers are able to differentiate, they obtain market power and may contribute to aggregate productivity gains by either specialization or rationalization of production. Both aspects are captured by the parameter . The consequences of these alternative channels are quite different, however. Intensive investment boosts the capital stock because it replaces old vintages with new ones of larger capacity. The range of goods N t , or the degree of diversification, remains constant but rationalization raises plant productivity and cuts unit costs and prices. As old vintages are increasingly replaced with more efficient new ones, the price index in (4) declines on account of lower component prices and real income rises. Note that rationalization is exclusively policy induced. Extensive investment, in contrast, expands the product range. The external economies due to specialization and diversification of production result in increasing returns to scale at the macro level which reflect a process of mutual reinforcement and cumulative causation in investment. 8 A lower price index reduces the cost of capital and boosts investment which feeds back again on the price index to stimulate further investment. In principle, the external economies in investment may be strong enough to give rise to sustained growth based on increasing returns due to specialization' as in Romer (1987) . In a sense, the model provides a microfoundation for AK t -type endogenous growth models where production is linear in the accumulating factor. Consider a Cobb±Douglas technology, f K t K t . The real income function in (18) becomes D t K À1 t and the private return is
In the limiting case with 2 À , real income is indeed linear in capital, D t K t , and the gross return is a constant m 1a2 À . Growth is sustained 8. Benassy (1996) emphasized that increasing returns in monopolistic competition are not due to profits but stem from specialization effects, as reflected in (18) Basu and Fernald (1997) implies that productive spillovers across firms would surely not be so large that the specialization parameter could attain the critical value 2 À .
INVESTMENT PROMOTION

How effective is the start-up subsidy?
We now analyze the effects of a proportional ITC and contrast it with a start-up subsidy as an alternative means of promoting business formation. We assume the initial equilibrium to be stationary and log-linearize the model to obtain policy effects in a neighborhood of the initial steady state (ISS). 9 A basic stability condition is that the interest rate in (21) keeps falling with capital accumulation. The first part of the Appendix thus derives
where Kf H Kaf K denotes capital's share in factor income and ' k À1 À f H KaKf HH K measures the elasticity of substitution in production. Capital accumulation clearly depresses the rental and profit rates in (21). The stability condition may be violated, however, if investment is extensive and results in too large gains from specialization. They squeeze the price index and thereby boost the real return which encourages further investments. For investment to remain bounded, the specialization parameter must be restricted. With Cobb±Douglas technology, the condition would reduce to `2 À which we may safely assume to be fulfilled as we argued in the preceding section. If the elasticity ' k falls short of unity, the condition becomes even less restrictive. With diminishing returns to capital, real income is increasing and concave in capital. Section 2 of the Appendix log-linearizes the equilibrium conditions noted in (20):
A hat, such as K t dK t aK, indicates a percentage change relative to (stationary) initial values. Since K 0 initially due to the ISS assumption, its relative change is defined as K t d K t aK. In taking the differentials at the ISS position, the coefficients are time autonomous while the deviations depend on time. For the policy parameters, we usefully define z dza1 À z and ( d(a À (. We consider only permanent, time-autonomous shocks.
where r S D H Kha À and " c ha aCaK are used for short notation. The effect of the start-up subsidy on machine size, À" (, depends on the elasticity " Àh H a h HH b 0.
The long-run effects of investment promotion obtain from the stationary version of (23). The second line yields the effects on capital investments which may then be substituted into the first line to obtain the long-run response of consumption:
An ITC z and a start-up subsidy ( look quite similar in terms of their effects on investment if introduced in small magnitudes. They effectively achieve the same impact. In granting an ITC, the government pays in proportion to the size of the start-up investment and, thus, makes more investment profitable. The start-up subsidy ( similarly encourages investment. However, agents now face an incentive to choose smaller capacities ( À" (`0; see the Appendix) and to launch a larger number of product lines instead. Investment shifts towards a more extensive nature that enhances the diversification and specialization of industry but forfeits the gains from rationalization and mass production. This latter aspect is reflected in long-run consumption. Both types of subsidies boost income and consumption by expanding the capital stock. In shifting the structure of investment into the extensive direction, however, the start-up subsidy becomes less potent in raising long-run consumption. The larger the subsidy rate is in the initial equilibrium, the less effective the start-up subsidy becomes to further boost income and consumption. As the Appendix proves in (A.2), the same pattern obtains for the instantaneous effect:
where " is the positive eigenvalue of the linearized system. To initiate the same amount of investment by means of a start-up subsidy, agents must forgo relatively more consumption. The transitional solution converges to the long-run effects in (24) at a rate `0 which is the stable eigenvalue (see Section 3 of the Appendix):
Accumulation of capital occurs along with a continuous change in production structure when a higher start-up subsidy is applied. Investors opt for smaller capacity of new units. Pre-existing plants, however, continue to operate at their historically chosen production scale until equipment wears out and is replaced as indicated in (19) . Heterogeneity of the production sector emerges endogenously during the transition. Section 2 emphasized that unit costs, prices and sales may differ among old and new vintages. Such heterogeneity eventually disappears again when all pre-existing units are finally replaced with new ones. Before we turn to welfare analysis and a discussion of the market distortions, we summarize the main findings of this section. Both types of investment incentives have equivalent effects on capital accumulation. Similarly, a small increase z ( of either subsidy is equally effective in raising long-run consumption if starting from a value of zero. With large increases, or if raised from an already positive level, the start-up subsidy becomes inferior to the ITC in terms of its effects on consumption.
Optimal investment incentives
Is the start-up investment decision of private agents distorted? Does the number of business upstarts and their chosen capacity correctly reflect all the socially relevant costs and benefits of business formation? Should aggregate investment be of a more intensive or extensive nature? To answer these questions, we now investigate the welfare consequences of investment promotion. A consistent welfare evaluation needs to take account of the long-run as well as transitional effects on consumption. With details given in the Appendix, the policy's impact on welfare is (see (A.4)):
dU
The term r S is defined in (23) and is interpreted as the social rate of return on investment. It indicates the increase in real income if one unit of consumption is postponed for more investment now. 10 Comparing with the private rate of return given in (21), a wedge r S À r 1 À z À ( À 1 h i r 28
is observed. In the absence of any subsidies, privately chosen capacity is unity and the wedge between rates of return is proportional to À 1 b 0. A social return in excess of the private one indicates under-accumulation of capital in market equilibrium.
With this information at hand, we may discuss the welfare consequences of investment promotion. Since r & in the initial equilibrium, the second term in (27) depends exclusively on the sign of the wedge between the social and private rates of return. It captures the welfare gains from the policy's effect on 10.
It may be derived from optimization by a social planner. In equating the marginal value products of labor in all places, the planner allocates workers across machines in the same way as the private economy. Consequently, maximum real income is given by (18). The rate of accumulation and capacity are then chosen to maximize (1) subject to the resource constraint (20a). The conditions for an optimum are h S S h H S and C S t aC S t r S t À & with r S t D H K S t h S a S À . The market equilibrium replicates the social optimum if subsidies are set as in (29) below. Capacity choice in (13) is optimal for ( Ã 0. In equating the private and social return, r S r, (20) also ensures optimal investment. capital accumulation. Any shock, or any policy intervention, that enhances investment incentives, creates dynamic welfare gains by alleviating the underaccumulation problem. If capital accumulation were optimal in the first place (r S &), further accumulation would not yield any increase in welfare.
In practice, governments often intend to encourage start-ups by giving entry subsidies of a limited amount per project that are frequently unrelated to the size of proposed projects. Such a specific subsidy encourages investment and generates welfare gains from induced capital formation much like the ITC. But it also shifts investment towards a more extensive nature by raising the rate of business formation at the expense of scale. With small subsidy rates, welfare is not much affected by this redirection of investment, the losses are of secondorder magnitude. It is quite remarkable that small values of a start-up subsidy and an ITC are in fact equivalent when starting from the laissez-faire equilibrium. The investment bias starts to hurt only with larger rates. The subsidy reduces the coefficient ha in (20a) by d ha À("a À ( ( where the strength of this effect is proportional to the wedge 11 S À . The first term in (27) is negative on this account and measures the present value of static welfare losses. As compared to the ITC, agents must sacrifice more consumption to support a given rate of investment. While such a policy succeeds to promote the rate of business formation, it impairs welfare because the losses from derationalization dominate over the gains from increasing specialization.
What is the welfare optimal policy of investment promotion? Subsidy rates are optimal if the marginal welfare gains in (27) from further rate increases are exhausted, 12
To replicate the social optimum, the government should abstain from offering a start-up subsidy and rely on the ITC only. Markets provide the right incentives regarding capacity choice and the direction of investment. An ITC, indeed, is neutral with respect to scale. It boosts the private return on investment until it matches the social return and, thereby, eliminates the wedge in (28). A socially optimal level of capital is attained.
To understand the nature of the externalities associated with private decision-making, we investigate more closely how the wedge between social and private returns emerges. Being one among many, a private investor takes the price index and the profit rate as given. The social planner, in contrast, acts 11.
Instead of (13), h h H should hold in a social optimum; see the preceding footnote. Capacity is optimal for a zero subsidy. When ( b 0, we could attain the optimum by setting d S À and d( À(. Since À" ( or d " a À (d(, the subsidy rate is related to the wedge between socially and privately optimal capacity by s À a ("a À (. The first term in (27) is thus proportional to the wedge S À which is, however, created by the subsidy itself rather than any inherent market distortion. 12.
Alternatively, the optimal policies may also be derived by comparing the social optimum to the untaxed market equilibrium as indicated in footnote 10. The policy conclusions therefore do not depend on the ISS assumption and the log-linear approximation at the ISS.
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Consider first extensive investment, dK t h dI t . From a social perspective, one may distinguish four distinct effects. First, it marginally increases valueadded income by f H K w K . This value-added effect corresponds to the imputed rental rate of capital. A second benefit is the profit creation effect %. For each unit of capacity added by start-up investment, profits rise by %.
Multiplying the first part of (30) with ha , we obtain the perceived private return to business formation that would obtain in the laissez-faire equilibrium as noted in (21). While the private investor fully takes account of the valueadded and profit creation effects, she takes the profit rate and the price index as given. Consequently, she fails to recognize that she contributes to a higher aggregate capital stock as well, affecting the other investors' returns. All other investors act the same way which feeds back on her own incentives.
The second term in (30) reflects the spillovers which are ignored by the individual agent but are internalized by the social planner. A third consequence external to the private investor is that a higher capital stock erodes the sales and the profit rate of existing producers. By (16), this profit destruction effect is equal to K% H À 1f H À %. Finally, extensive investment starts new workshops and deepens the degree of diversification and division of labor in industry. This specialization effect squeezes the price index in (17) by 1 P dP dK 1 À aK and thereby boosts real income by Àf %KP H aP À 1% %. The variety and profit destruction effects are consolidated to give a total external investment benefit of À 1f H %. Consequently, the external returns to investment are just À 1 times the perceived private returns. In the absence of any taxes or subsidies, this factor precisely gives the wedge indicated in (28). Without policy intervention, capital accumulation falls short of the socially optimal amount. The optimal ITC just rewards for the net external benefits that private agents create for the rest of the community and thereby restores socially optimal investment decisions. 13
13.
The ITC reduces spending on investment to
The optimal ITC thereby equates the demand price of specialized inputs with marginal cost, 1 À z Ã p j t 1aA j t ; see (9). The tax credit necessary to internalize the spillovers in private investment decisions exactly eliminates the wedge between price and marginal cost of intermediate (capital) goods.
Why is the optimal start-up subsidy zero? Consider the effects from shifting investment towards a more intensive form such that the overall amount h I of new capacity added to the capital stock remains the same. Pure profits %K depend linearly on installed capacity K. It does not matter for profits how the choice of splits investment h I between capacity and number of new workshops as long as overall capacity is expanded by the same amount. Similarly, the profit rate %K depends only on the aggregate capital stock, irrespective of whether it is installed in a large number of small workshops or vice versa. However, the tradeoff between variety and scale may affect real income by its effect on the productivity of the final goods sector. When opting for larger size, one needs to reduce the number of new workshops by dI t ad t ÀIh H ah in order to achieve the same investment level h I. As production becomes less diversified, productivity falls according to (4) by
where dN t dI t since the number of new goods coincides with the number of newly established businesses. It is claimed that this specialization effect is just offset by a rationalization effect. According to (5) and (9), rationalization due to larger capacity cuts unit costs and prices of the I most recent brands by dp t ad t À À 1ph H ah which, in turn, squeezes the price index by dP t adp t P aÀ1 p 1a1ÀÀ1 I. Inserting these derivatives into dP t d dP t dI t dI t d dP t dp t dp t d 0 verifies the claim. The rationalization effect from larger capacities squeezes the price index by lowering component prices. A smaller number of new businesses impairs diversification, however. This negative specialization effect inflates the price index by an amount that exactly offsets the savings from rationalization. Shifting investment on the margin towards a more intensive form neither changes profits nor the price index and, consequently, leaves real income D in (18) unaffected. Capacity choice is left to maximize the amount of new capital h a that may be added to the capital stock for each unit of postponed consumption. The laissez-faire solution in (13) solves this problem. With capacity fixed in this way, the rate of business formation I t provides for optimal capital accumulation. In the end, there is no reason for offering a start-up subsidy to boost the rate of businesses formation since the gains from specialization only come at the expense of scale economies due to mass production. We summarize these results: In market equilibrium, the private return falls short of the social return to capital by r S À r À 1 r . Aggregate investment is too low. The optimal ITC internalizes the net benefits that are external to the individual investor. A start-up subsidy is not advised. To evaluate these results, one must recognize that the parameter assumes a number of different roles. As is standard in the monopolistic competition literature, it measures specialization as well as profit creation and destruction effects. We have additionally made the rationalization effect dependent on this parameter by writing plant productivity as in (5). Several of the aforementioned effects of investment and capacity choice thus exactly offset each other. Nevertheless, the analysis identified the distinct channels through which the subsidies tend to affect welfare. One could speculate how results would change if we relaxed one of our restrictions. Choosing larger capacities, for example, would increase the price index if the losses from diminished diversification would dominate over the gains from rationalization. In taking the price index as given, investors would neglect these external costs and choose overly large capacities at the expense of variety. In this case, a start-up subsidy would be called for to encourage more extensive investment.
Our analysis is also restrictive in assuming a constant demand elasticity '. Spence (1976, p. 232) found that the tradeoff between variety and scale is less determinate in case of variable demand elasticities. Replacing x j t 1a in (3) by 0x j t , he found that optimal scale falls short of equilibrium scale if the elasticity x0 H a0 decreases in x, while in our case the elasticity is constant. We thus conjecture that socially optimal capacity would be lower if we allowed for falling demand elasticities. A positive start-up subsidy could then help to induce smaller capacity choice and stimulate entry. Increasing demand elasticities, in contrast, would call for a start-up tax to prevent excessive entry and to encourage rationalization by means of larger capacities. Unfortunately, the sensitivity of our results with respect to a more flexible modeling of demand elasticities, markups, specialization and plant level productivity can be tested only at the cost of a rather more complex model that precludes closedform solutions and becomes rather intractable. The results of this paper are thus best viewed as an important benchmark case.
CONCLUSIONS
The paper merged a model of vintage capital with production of specialized intermediate inputs under conditions of monopolistic competition. Within this framework, we were able to demonstrate how government may influence not only the level but also the direction of investment. Capital accumulation results in aggregate productivity gains of two alternative forms. Extensive investment targets gains from specialization while intensive investment aims at cost savings due to rationalization and mass production. The paper identified investment externalities that result in under-accumulation of capital. Some form of investment promotion is called for.
Governments often provide an entry subsidy in a fixed amount for each new start-up. Such a policy aims at accelerating the rate of business formation by shifting investment towards a more extensive and innovative form. On the part of private investors, the subsidy creates incentives to start up a larger number of smaller businesses in order to capture it more often. A start-up subsidy is, indeed, effective in generating medium-run growth and can look deceptively similar to an ITC. However, shifting investment towards a more extensive form may not be helpful. While it helps to exploit gains from specialization, it forfeits the cost savings from rationalization and mass production. Within the confines of our model, markets in fact tend to provide correct incentives for capacity and scale. Encouraging start-ups at the expense of capacity could only be an inferior policy. The policy problem is to promote investment and business formation of the right size. In our benchmark case, a proportional investment tax credit is more appropriate than a start-up subsidy since it avoids distorting the tradeoff between variety and scale. dr t r m t h t z À À ( h i
Defining ( d(a À (, we obtain from (13) the subsidy's effect on capacity choice:
h H ( and, thus, À" (, where the elasticity " Àh H a h HH reflects the curvature of the installation function h . Therefore, À ( h À ( whence real interest depends on policy according to dr t r m t z ( .
Log-linearization
Local dynamics is usefully characterized by taking a log-linear approximation of (20) at the initial steady-state (ISS) position. Define K t d K t aK, use r S D H K h À and " c h C K for short-hand notation. Exploiting the SS property K t 0, the log-linearized form of (20a) is K t r S K t À " c C t Á d ha . The entry subsidy affects the size of investment projects by (13), À" (, and determines how much additional capacity is created per unit of foregone consumption, d ha À("a À ( (. Thus, we have the first line in (23). Since r & holds in the ISS, the loglinearized form of the Euler equation is C t dr t . Substituting dr t from the preceding paragraph together with (22), one obtains the final form given in the second line of (23).
Transitional dynamics
A consistent welfare evaluation requires to consider the complete transitional adjustment. In matrix notation, (23) reads as X t ZX t G where X t denotes the vector of the two dynamic variables, Z is the coefficients matrix, and G is a vector with elements g 1 À (" À ( ( and g 2 & z (
To check stability, one evaluates the characteristic polynomial É3 j3I À Zj 3 2 À r S 3 À & " c and finds that it satisfies Ér S É0 jZj À & " c`0 due to the stability condition stated in (22). Hence, the eigenvalues fY " g split into `0`r S`"
A.1
Comparing r S with r as given in (21), we have " b r S b r & in the equilibrium without government activity (z ( 0 and 1). Since the characteristic polynomial is quadratic, it would definitely satisfy É&`Ér S `0. With investment incentives in the ISS, & b r S , but we assume that É&`0 always. Note further that the product of the eigenvalues is equal to the determinant and the sum equals the trace of Z whence " À & " c and " r S . The long-run solutions in (24) derive from X I ÀZ À1 G or C I g 1 " c À r S g 2 " and K I À " cg 2 "
Subtracting them from X t ZX t G results in an autonomous system X t Z X t À X I with the solution
The eigenvector of the stable root `0 satisfies 2 r S À À Á a" c Â Ã 1 . The solution at t 0 must satisfy the initial condition K 0 0 whence 1 À K I and C 0 À C I 2 r S À À Á a" c Â Ã 1 , or C 0 C I À r S À " c K I g 1 " c À g 2 " AX2
Substituting the g-coefficients yields (25). Given C 0 , the transitional dynamics in (26) emerges from the general solution formula.
Welfare
The change in lifetime welfare in (1) reflects the present value of changes in consumption,
Using (26), the wealth equivalent welfare effect, dU 0 au H C, relative to ISS consumption C, is
Inserting the short-and long-run solutions gives
A.4
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